On Sikh ethics; includes brief biographies of Sikh religious leaders.

Study of rationalism in Urdu literature.

Translation and interpretation of selected Hadith on Islamic ethics and coduct.

Islamic ethics in the light of Qurʼanic teaching and Hadith; Customs and practices.

Context: The journal Constructivist Foundations celebrates ten years of publishing articles on constructivist approaches, in particular radical constructivism. Problem: In order to preserve the sustainability of radical constructivism and regain its appeal to new generations of researchers, we set up a new course of action for and with the radical constructivist community to study its innovative potential. This new avenue is “second-order science.” Method: We specify two motivations of second-order science, i.e., the inclusion of the observer, and self-reflexivity that allows (...) second-order science to operate on the products of normal or first-order science. Also, we present a short overview of the contributions that we have collected for this inaugural issue on second-order science. Results: These six initial contributions demonstrate the potential of the new set of approaches to second-order science across several disciplines. Implications: Second-order science is believed to be a cogent concept in the evolution of science, leading to a new wave of innovations, novel experiments and a much closer relationship with current research in the cognitive neurosciences in particular, and with evolutionary and complexity theories in general. (shrink)

The concept of experience has been central to European philosophy since Descartes. He was the first to use experience to distinguish between two kinds of substance, mental and material, on the basis of the fact that one kind of substance is extended but does not think, while the other kind thinks, doubts, wills, imagines and feels, but is not extended. Other philosophers, such as Hobbes, Locke and Hume, made the concept of experience the basis of their analysis of knowledge. These (...) ideas have become part of common sense, and provide the background for a range of philosophical problems from Descartes’ time to the present. While the concept of experience is important for philosophy, philosophers do not all have the same understanding of the nature of experience. (shrink)

Study of the religious and philosophical views of Sir Muḥammad Iqbal, 1877-1938.

This book uses the writings of Syed Alam Khundmiri to look at issues such as: Islamic traditionalism in the context of meodernization; Islamic theology and politics; and Western and Indian notions of secularism.

Successful applications of a conceptually novel setup of Quantum Field Theory, that accounts for all subtheories of the Standard Model (QED, Electroweak Interaction and Higgs, Yang–Mills and QCD) and beyond (Helicity 2), call for a perspective view in a broader conceptual context. The setting is “autonomous” in the sense of being intrinsically quantum. Its principles are: Hilbert space, Poincaré symmetry and causality. Its free quantum fields are obtained from Wigner’s unitary representations of the Poincaré group, with only physical and observable (...) degrees of freedom. A “quantization” of an “underlying” classical theory is not needed. It allows renormalizable perturbation theory with interactions whose detailed structure, and in some cases even the particle content, is predicted by internal consistency. The results confirm and extend observable predictions for the interactions of the Standard Model without assuming a “principle” of gauge invariance. (shrink)

DaB fUr die Entwicklung der Phanomenologie Husserls nicht zuletzt auch,wissenschaftstheoretische' Motive ausschlaggebend waren, ist hinreichend bekannt. Umso mehr verwundert es, daB die Husserl-Rezeption sich diese Motive nur selten zueigen gemacht hat. Zwar sind in einer Reihe von Einzel­ wissenschaften, wie in der Literaturwissenschaft, der Sozialwissenschaft und besonders auch der Psychologie, phanomenologische Motive wirksam gewor­ den. Versuche einer ausdriicklichen wissenschaftskritischen Anwendung der Husserlschen Philosophie auf einzelwissenschaftliehe Theorien jedoch, wie sie z.B. Alfred Schiitz in seinem friihen Werk zur phanomenologischen Grundlegung der "verstehenden (...) Soziologie"l ansatzweise unternommen hat, sind rar. Freilich ging auch Husserl hier nieht eben mit gutem Beispiel voran. Auch er selbst hat seine wissenschaftstheoretische Programmatik nirgends einer ernsthaften Bewahrungsprobe unterzogen. Die vorliegende Untersuchung will diese Frage einer wissenschaftstheore­ tischen Anwendbarkeit der transzendentalen Phiinomenologie paradigmatisch im Hinblick auf die Problemstellungen der Geschiehtswissenschaft iiberprii­ fen. Was also kann die Phanomenologie fUr die Historik leisten? DaB sieh fiir eine solche Absieht gerade die geschichtstheoretischen Perspektiven in Hus­ serls Werk anbieten, hat vor allem zwei Griinde. (shrink)

The aim of this dissertation is to present a systematic account of F. H. Bradley's philosophy in so far as it is relevant to an understanding of his conception of the nature and criterion of truth. I argue that, for Bradley, the nature of truth is the identity of thought with reality given in immediate experience. There is no absolute separation between thought and its object. Bradley therefore rejects both the correspondence theory and epistemological realism. Thought is not just a (...) mirror which reflects an independently existing reality. ;Concerning the criterion of truth, I argue that his criterion for our ordinary and scientific beliefs is practice, and the criterion for philosophical positions is a kind of coherence based on the doctrine of relative truth. For Bradley, some positions are truer than others, and the best philosophy is a comprehensive system which contains the truth of all different positions. ;Bradley does not accept the coherence theory of justification as it is understood today, since it is based on the standard account of negation and the doctrine of absolute truth. Bradley has a different approach to negation and inconsistency, according to which there are no absolutely inconsistent beliefs. Further, he insists that truth is not absolute but "relative," a matter of degree. All philosophical positions contain some truth, and none is completely false. The truth in philosophy is a position which accounts for the whole of reality and includes all apparently inconsistent positions within it. ;I explain Bradley's place in the history of philosophy and show his connections with the British empiricist tradition. I believe one of Bradley's central concerns is to explain the nature and criterion of truth in philosophy within the constraints of empiricism. I also contrast Bradley's positions on important issues with those of philosophers in the Anglo-American analytic tradition, such as Russell, Moore, Ayer, Tarski, Quine, Churchland, Lehrer and Campbell. I argue that most recent commentators on Bradley overlook the importance of understanding his philosophy as a system constructed according to the doctrine of relative truth. (shrink)

Context: The main problem is the rather marginal status of radical constructivism within its core domains of brain research, cognition and learning. Problem: The basic goal is to provide a short history of radical constructivism and its institutionalization processes. Additionally, the article specifies critical conditions that should be met in order for radical constructivism to become a mainstream endeavor. Method: The main methods used are those of comparative historical research. Results: The main results lie in the specification of missing elements (...) that have blocked radical constructivism becoming a mainstream endeavor. Implications: The paper might serve as a common reference for necessary steps to be taken over the following years in order to move radical constructivism out of its current weak position. (shrink)

Purpose: The article pursues three aims. First, it intends to differentiate between two different approaches for knowledge studies, namely an empirical and a normative mode. In a second move, two different epistemologies in the work of Ernst von Glasersfeld will be introduced under the labels of “Epistemology I” and “Epistemology II.” Epistemology I relates to empirical research, Epistemology II is normative in nature. Third, the article makes the point that while Ernst von Glasersfeld’s Epistemology II has already been presented in (...) a finite and mature form, his empirical analysis of cognitive processes still provides a rich pool of tools and designs that should be further developed and advanced in the years and decades ahead. Method: The article is analytical in nature, identifying the different building blocks and relational networks of von Glasersfeld’s two epistemologies. By this, the article intends to contribute to a further advancement of von Glasersfeld’s Epistemology I. Results: The main finding lies in recognizing the radical and innovative elements of von Glasersfeld’s Epistemology I and on the still-challenging research designs of Epistemology I. (shrink)

On the eminence and dignity of parents; in the light of Koran and Hadith (Islamic traditions).

Open peer commentary on the article “Observing Environments” by Hugo F. Alrøe & Egon Noe. Upshot: The following remarks elaborate on the basic concepts of observation and environment. Some extensions are suggested, mainly from the perspective of Luhmann’s theory of social systems. Especially, the concept of structural couplings is given more emphasis, not least because of its relevance to the sustainability debate.

Alvin Plantinga, in the ninth chapter ofThe Nature of Necessity, sets out a defence of the Free Will Defence (FWD)2. In what follows, I shall set out, to begin with, a statement of the main line of his argument3. I shall, then, set out a number of minor criticisms of the ninth chapter. Finally, I shall set out a criticism of Plantinga’s argument.

Open peer commentary on the target article “Who Conceives of Society?” by Ernst von Glasersfeld. Excerpt: I will make the point that radical constructivism von Glasersfeld style unnecessarily plays only a passive or an inactive role. Quite obviously, I want to demonstrate that there is life for radical constructivism outside its seemingly irrelevant function in empirical social research and that it is possible to develop radical constructivism in designs with tangible consequences and effects for the cognitive routines in the social (...) sciences. In short, it is conceivable, despite “Who Conceives of Society?”, that radical constructivism matters. (shrink)